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U.S. Monetary Policy and Herding: Evidence from Commodity 
Markets 
 
Abstract  This paper investigates the presence of herding behavior across a spectrum 
of commodities (i.e., agricultural, energy, precious metals, and metals) futures prices 
obtained from Datastream. The main novelty of this study is, for the first time in the 
literature, the explicit investigation of the role of deviations of U.S. monetary policy 
decisions from a standard Taylor-type monetary rule, in driving herding behavior with 
respect to commodity futures prices, spanning the period 1990-2017. The results 
document that the commodity markets are characterized by herding, while such herding 
behavior is not only driven by U.S. monetary policy decisions, but also such decisions 
exert asymmetric effects this behavior. An additional novelty of the results is that they 
document that herding is stronger in discretionary monetary policy regimes. 
Keywords: Herd behavior; commodity futures prices; U.S. monetary policy 
JEL Classification: E44; G10 
 
Introduction 
Financial markets often appear to behave frantically, which indicates dramatic changes 
in investors’ behavior. The resulting price volatility is inconsistent with rational traders 
and informationally efficient markets and is attributed to investors’ ‘animal instincts’ 
(Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001). Such a stylized fact is associated with herding 
behavior in which investors follow the crowd. This herding can occur when agents’ 
private information is swamped by the information derived from observing others and 






The literature explored the impact of monetary policy decisions on asset prices, 
where such decisions provided an informational mechanism that transmits expectations 
about the future course of interest rates and allowed investors to constantly revise their 
expectations about the impact of interest rates on asset prices (Bernanke and Kuttner, 
2005; Rosa, 2013). Although a wide strand of the literature examined the impact of 
commodity prices on macroeconomic variables (Kilian, 2008, offered an excellent 
survey on evidence regarding the association between commodity prices and 
macroeconomic variables), less attention was spent on the impact of monetary policy 
decisions on asset commodity prices. According to theoretical arguments, monetary 
policy can affect asset pricing through four primary mechanisms/channels, i.e. the 
portfolio balance channel, the signaling or information channel, a confidence channel, 
and enhancing market liquidity and reducing risk premia. When it comes to commodity 
pricing, there exist additional channels, including through other financial variables, 
particularly interest rates and exchange rates, as well as additional channels, via 
(expectations of) inflation and economic growth (Barsky and Kilian,, 2004). These 
extra channels act in cooperation with the traditional for asset pricing channels since 
commodities are closely considered as substitutes to other assets (Rigobon and Sack, 
2004).  
This paper focuses, as this is the main novelty of this study, on exploring what 
is the role of deviations of U.S. monetary policy decisions from a standard Taylor-type 
monetary rule, in driving herding behavior in relevance to commodity futures prices. 
No study has explored so far the role of monetary policy deviations on forward 
commodity prices. In the presence of such deviations, the wrong signal is provided to 
the market participants and wrong portfolio decisions will be reached. Such wrong 
decisions have further repercussions for the course of the real economy as well, mainly 





expected to further excarcebate any herding type of investment behaviors. The 
perceived credibility of monetary policy strategies were expected to influence the 
expectation formation process by market participants and was likely to establish the 
degree of volatility in these expectations (Bernanke, 2004; Coenen and Wieland, 2005; 
Issing, 2005). Alternatively, deviations of monetary policy decisions from their 
expected paths could induce herd behaviors in asset markets which may arise as the 
result of an informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) coming from the wrong 
informational signals from interest rate and inflation trends that ‘motivate’ market 
participants to invest in asset markets, regardless of the presence of their possible 
negative own private signals. Thus, herding may be arising as the result of certain 
monetary policy news about the future course of interest rates and/or inflation that 
eventually failed to materialize (Christiano et al., 2007).  
Over the recent years, commodities have played an increasingly significant role 
in the asset allocations of institutional investors. The investments in commodities take 
a variety of forms, including those in real assets, futures, indexes, equities, and hedge 
funds. In portfolio management, commodities can serve a variety of functions from 
volatility and/or inflation hedges to purely speculative plays. Based on this discussion, 
the paper truly emphasizes the investment approach when it comes to herding. When 
investors invest in the producers of commodities, rather than indexes or futures, they 
have a greater opportunity to confront social and environmental implications of their 
investment. In that respect, investments in the equities of commodities producers may 
actually, and counter-intuitively, turn out to be less correlated to the equities market as 
a whole than investments in the commodities themselves. The findings are expected to 
provide guidance for a monetary policy strategy that will be sufficient to monitor 
closely monetary, credit and financial developments as potential driving forces for 







In relevance to the herding behavior, a number of studies highlight the tendency of 
investors to follow each other and trade the same assets at the same time (Chiang et al., 
2010). Herding examined in banking (Devenow and Welch, 1996), equity markets 
(Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Narayan et al., 2015; Economou et al., 2018), and analyst’s 
forecasts and food commodities (Gleason et al., 2003).  
A paper by Demirer et al. (2015) explores the role of stock markets in the 
presence of herding behavior in commodity futures markets. They test the presence of 
herding in a number of commodity sectors, while their findings document the presence 
of herding in grains only during the high volatility state. The literature has also tested 
the assumption of an efficient market, where all prices reflect the available information; 
this assumption was widely applied in the commodities market to explain whether 
prices were driven by fundamentals or sentiment (Hwang et al., 2018). In that sense, 
market traders could overreact and push prices away from fundamentals, with rational 
traders responding to imposing prices to equilibrium. Thus, prices may deviated from 
supply and demand fundamentals, but only momentary (Fishe and Smith, 2019). 
Recently, Gerson de Souza Raimundo Júnior et al. (2020) analyzed the behavior of food 
commodities between 2000 and 2018 to test the presence of herding. Their results 
suggested that betas herding may deviate from the fundamentals, although they tend to 
revert faster to stability between demand and supply disequilibrium conditions, which 
resulted in equilibrium in the long-run risk-return factor.  
Certain papers in the literature of monetary policy rules (Taylor, 1993; Kahn, 
2012) made use of policy interest rates as indicators of the monetary policy stance. 
Although such monetary rules have been a useful yardstick for assessing monetary 





rendering monetary policy systematically accommodative from the perspective of this 
benchmark, as between the early 2000s and the outbreak of the recent global financial 
crisis (Ahrend et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the literature has not reached a consensus on 
this issue (Taylor, 2007; Bernanke, 2010; Zhang and Pan, 2019). Taylor (2010, 2012) 
argued that the presence of deviations from a standard monetary policy rule reflected a 
significant change in the policy regime, which he dubbed the ‘Great Deviation’, albeit 
this was rejected by Bernanke (2010). 
In terms of the association between monetary policy and commodity prices, 
monetary conditions attracted attention as possible driving factors of commodity prices. 
Barsky and Kilian (2004) showed that monetary policy stance was a good predictor of 
commodity prices. They provided evidence that oil price increases in the 1970s could 
have been caused by monetary policy decisions. The majority of empirical studies in 
this strand of the literature attempt to assess the relationship between monetary policy 
and commodity prices, by making use of policy interest rates as the primary indicators 
of the monetary policy stance (Frankel and Rose, 2010). Hayo et al. (2012) analyzed 
the impact of U.S. monetary policy activities on commodity price volatility. Their 
results illustrated that U.S. monetary policy had a significant impact on price volatility. 
Hammoudeha et al. (2015) examined the effects of the U.S. monetary policy on sectoral 
commodity prices. Their reference documented that U.S. monetary contractions led to 
immediate rises in commodity prices, reflecting greater expected inflation and 
speculation, high production costs or some overshooting.  
However, in certain times, monetary policy revealed not the expected messages 
(i.e., deviations from expected decisions) and thus, investors may over- or under-
reacted to unexpected information changes (Bondt and Thaler, 1985), thus, leading to 
irrational investment choices. Galariotis et al. (2015) used the Fama-French three factor 





valuation, while they decomposed the reactions of market participants into fundamental 
and non-fundamental information parts. In addition, any deviations of expected 




This paper measures herding on a number of commodities from January 1990 to 
December 2017. Daily data on a number of commodities futures prices are obtained: 
sugar, corn, wheat, oats, cocoa, cotton, coffee, oil, natural gas, gold, silver, platinum, 
copper, nickel, and aluminium.  For the agricultural commodities the delivery months 
are January, March, May, July, and October), while for the remaining the delivery 
occurs across all months. Data were obtained from Datastream. 
The results are reported in terms of 1-, 2- and 3-months ahead in the month 
where such a contract is allowed. Data on the overall commodity futures market index, 
offered as the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) futures contracts for one 
month through three months are also obtained. The GSCI is a world production 
weighted index and contains many commodity futures, with the weight of energy 
commodities in the index being about 75%. Returns are measured as first percentage 
differences in logs, while data are obtained as daily closing prices. A total of 6,300 
observations (for each commodity) are considered. 
The reason the empirical analysis focuses on commodity futures prices rather 
than spot prices is manyfold. First, the (forward) monetary rule is based on expected 
(forecasted) variables and in that sense it is more rational to assume that this type of 
monetary policy (i.e., forward looking policy) should more explicitly impact futures 
than spot commodity prices. Second, according to Reeve and Vigfusson (2011), futures 





schemes when there is a sizeable difference between spot and futures prices, third, 
commodity futures prices reveal useful information about global commodity demands 
and, thus, global economic strength (Sockin and Xiong, 2012), and fourth (a reason 
intrigued by a referee), financial investors almost entirely trade commodity futures, 
since they have no means to store physical commodities. The nearby futures contracts 
in particular are the most traded and most liquid futures contract. In particular, 
commodity exchange-traded funds (ETFs) that replicate commodity indices, such as 
the S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) or the Bloomberg commodity index 
are also long in nearby futures contracts; it is, therefore, natural to inspect the nearby 
futures contracts when looking at signs of herding behavior. 
The timeframe covers highly interesting phases in the history of the U.S. 
monetary policy. In each phase, the Fed was confronted with a different policy problem 
(Williamson, 2014). The analysis covers the 1990-1991 recession, the slow recovery, 
and the disinflation to the end of 1993, the case of the Fed’s preemptive tightening 
against inflation in 1994-1995, the long boom to 1999 and the near full credibility for 
low inflation and rising trend productivity growth, the tightening of monetary policy to 
slow the growth of aggregate demand in 1999 and 2000, the collapse of investment in 
late 2000 and the recession in 2001, the 2002-2007 new boom characterized by very 
low interest rates, and the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the strong recession, 
unconventional monetary policy and the stabilization phase. 
 We also obtain monthly real-time data on both U.S. real output gap and U.S. 
consumer price index forecasting prices (from Datastream), as well as on U.S. monetary 
policy interest rates, proxied by the federal funds rate. The federal funds rate is proxied 
by the shadow federal funds rate, calculated by Wu and Xia (2016), given that over the 
post 2008 crisis, interest rates were constrained by the lower zero bound and we need 







Baseline Results: The Herding Behavior Effect 
The most common direction in the literature to explore herding is to study the collective 
behavior of all investors in addition to the market trend. The empirical analysis 
investigates the presence of herding through the cross-sectional absolute standard 
deviation (CSAD) methodology (Chang et. al, 2000) as a mesure of return dispersions: 
                                𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = (1 𝑁𝑁⁄ )∑ �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡�𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1     (1) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the return on commodity price i on day t, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 represents the returns on 
the corresponding market index and N is the number of commodity assets observations. 
The relationship between dispersion and market return is described through a non-linear 
equation (Demirer et al. (2015), which can easily detect herding, since it does not 
require large magnitudes of non-linearity. Thus, a new term was introduced in the 
CSAD methodology: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐0 + 𝑐𝑐1�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡� + 𝑐𝑐2𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡                                    (2) 
When herding is encountered during times of extreme market movements, the cross-
sectional dispersion of asset returns is expected to decrease or increase considerably 
less than proportional with market returns. The squared market return is introduced as 
an additional term in the regression to capture this non-linear relationship through a 
negative estimate of the coefficient c2.  
To assess the impact of the deviations of monetary policy on herding, we need 
to retrieve the time-varying nature of the herding coefficient (𝑐𝑐2). We avoid certain 
econometric drawbacks by assuming a representation with time-varying coefficients 






𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾1,𝑡𝑡�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡�+𝛾𝛾2,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡2 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡,  𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, … ,𝑇𝑇,                        (3) 
This time-varying modeling approach is motivated by the literature, which finds asset 
market return moments to be time-varying. In that sense, it is very likely that herding 
behavior, which actually is based on returns, is time-varying as well. This strand of the 
literature provided extensive empirical evidence of the presence of a time-varying 
market risk premium (Ferson and Harvey, 1991). This time-varying approach is based 
on the hypothesis that the level of aggregate risk aversion is time-varying. In a habit 
formation model, the representative agent’s risk aversion changes with the difference 
between consumption and the habit-level of consumption. This habit-level was based 
on past consumption (Constantinides, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). The 
analysis will estimate model (3) using the local linear approach proposed by Cai (2007), 
which allows for heteroskedasticity and serially correlated errors. Model (3) yields: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡′𝛤𝛤𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡,                                                        (4) 
where, 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = (1, �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡�,  𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡2 )′, 𝛤𝛤𝑡𝑡 = (𝛾𝛾0,𝑡𝑡 , 𝛾𝛾1,𝑡𝑡 , 𝛾𝛾2,𝑡𝑡)′, 𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡⁄ ) = 0, 𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡2 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡⁄ ) =
𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡2(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡), {(𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 ,𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡)} is strictly stationary α-mixing, but {𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡} and {𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡} may not be 
independent, with 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡2(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡)  ⁄ . To estimate 𝛤𝛤𝑡𝑡 assume that 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗(∙)  (𝑗𝑗 = 0,1,2) has a 
continuous second derivative and can be approximated by a first degree Taylor 
polynomial at any fixed time point 𝜏𝜏 ∈ [0,1]: 
𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) ≈ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗(𝜏𝜏) + 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗′(𝜏𝜏)(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏),  𝑗𝑗 = 0,1,2,                                      (5) 
where 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗′(𝜏𝜏) the first derivative of 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗(𝜏𝜏) and 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇⁄ . Hence, model (3) can be 
approximated by a local linear model: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡′𝛩𝛩 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡, where            𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 = �
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏)
�      and 𝛩𝛩 = �
𝛤𝛤(𝜏𝜏)
𝛤𝛤′(𝜏𝜏)�. 
The locally weighted sum of squares is: 





where 𝐾𝐾ℎ(𝜈𝜈) = 𝛫𝛫(𝜈𝜈 𝐶𝐶⁄ ), 𝛫𝛫(∙) is a kernel function, and 𝐶𝐶 is the bandwidth parameter. 
We obtain the local linear estimate of 𝛤𝛤𝑡𝑡 = (𝛾𝛾0,𝑡𝑡 , 𝛾𝛾1,𝑡𝑡 , 𝛾𝛾2,𝑡𝑡)′, by minimizing (6) with 
respect to 𝛩𝛩. We use the Epanechnikov kernel 𝛫𝛫(𝜈𝜈) = 0.75(1 − 𝜈𝜈2)𝛪𝛪(|𝜈𝜈| ≤ 1). Given 
that the  bandwidth selection is important, we employ a nonparametric version of 
Akaike criterion to select the optimal bandwidth: 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶) = log(𝜎𝜎�2) + 2(𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆+1)
𝑇𝑇−𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆+2
                                                   (7)  
where 𝜎𝜎�2 = (1 𝑇𝑇⁄ )∑ �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶� 𝑡𝑡�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 , �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶� 𝑡𝑡� is the fitted values of {𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡}, 
𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 the trace of the smoother matrix, 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆 associated with the bandwidth 𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶� =
𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = (1 ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2, … ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇)′. The estimation results are shown in 
Table 1. The estimated coefficients are allowed to change over the course of the time 
span under consideration, while the reported estimates represent the average estimate 
over this time span. The negative and statistically significant estimates of 𝛾𝛾2 suggest 
the presence of herding across all commodity markets, as well as across the three 
frequency futures data. Cai’s (2007) test clearly rejects the null hypothesis of the 
constancy of the 𝛾𝛾2,𝑡𝑡 coefficient. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Estimates of the Forward Monetary Rule 
The behavior of central banks could be assessed through deviations of the federal funds 
rate from a benchmark monetary policy rule (Kahn, 2012). A Taylor-type (1993) of rule 
implied that central banks targeted stabilising inflation around its target and output 
around its potential. Positive (negative) deviations of the two variables from their target 
were associated with a tightening (loosening) of monetary policy.   
The Fed, when announcing a decision, may change the target interest rate and 





al. (2005) argued that signaling future interest rate changes was the more important 
channel through which Fed’s actions could affect bond prices. Moreover, we estimated 
the response of commodity futures prices to the deviations of monetary policy from a 
standard (forward) Taylor monetary rule. 
Monetary authorities generally made policy decisions based on economic 
conditions expected in the future. Accordingly, a number of researchers prefered 
forward-looking, or forecast-based interest rate rules than contemporaneous rules. It 
was argued that using forward-looking data could implicitly include information that 
was not reflected onto inflation and output measures (Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999). 
Batini and Haldane (1999) argued that given that the presence of lags between the 
implementation of monetary policy and its first effects on inflation and output was well 
known, one could design forecast-based rules, such that they were taking into account 
these transmission lags. Failure to recognise these lags could result in cyclical 
instability. Moreover, expectations of monetary authorities were in general formulated 
based on a broad spectrum of information. In this sense, forecast-based rules were 
information encompassing rules. This was not necessarily a characteristic shared by 
other types of rules, such as the contemporaneous rules. A forward-looking monetary 
rule is described by the following process: 
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜌𝜌1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡                            (8) 
where 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the nominal policy rate and 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+1 is the forecasted output gap, i.e., the 
deviations from trend output. 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗 denotes the expectation or forecast formed today 
of inflation j periods in the future.  To respond to questions on whether it makes sense 
to discuss about the Taylor rule when interest rates were so low and inflation below the 
announced target, the paper considers a Taylor rule in which the policy rate is based on 
Wu and Xia (2016) “shadow interest rate”. This shadow policy rate accounts of the 





over the path of future interest rates (with the idea of lowering today’s real interest rate 
by raising the expectation of future inflation) and “quantitative easing” policies 
involving large-scale purchases of public and private bonds. These alternative tools, 
already battle-tested during the financial crisis, have been proven effective in stabilizing 
output and unemployment in a deep recession, following the crisis event. 
Table 2 reports the estimates of the forward-looking rule [Equation (8)]. The 
estimations are derived through the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) 
methodological approach (Clarida et al., 2000; Castro, 2011). The instrument list 
contains lagged values of inflation, the output gap, and interest rates. The empirical 
findings document an activist policy rule as the coefficient of inflation (𝛽𝛽) exceeds one 
and that of the output gap (𝛿𝛿) exceeds zero, while they are both statistically significant. 
As the estimated coefficient of the output gap is positive and significant, the Fed has 
implemented a stabilising policy for the economic outlook. Table 2 points out that the 
monetary authorities have reacted more strongly to the market participants’ perceptions 
about inflation compared to output stabilization. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Herding Behavior and Monetary Policy Deviations 
To measure the deviations of monetary policy, we follow the approach recommended 
by Smales and Apergis (2016). In particular, such deviations of monetary policy (DEV) 
are measured as the difference between actual interest rates and their fitted values from 
(3). Next, the analysis explores whether Taylor-type monetary rule deviations drive 
asset commodity prices. However, we can also ask whether asset prices drive these 
deviations, which may reflect the central bank’s reaction to asset price movements. 
Kuttner and Bernanke (2005) found that a typical unanticipated Fed funds rate cut of 





stock prices, while Rigobon and Sack (2003) found that a 5 percent decrease (increase) 
in the S&P500 over the course of a week raises the probability of a 25-basis-point 
interest rate cut (hike) by 64%. Although the data indicated that the Fed reacted directly 
to the stock market, statistical regressions did not reveal the motives behind this 
behavior. One possibility was that forward-looking policymakers viewed movements 
in the asset market as useful predictors of future economic activity. Similarly, forward-
looking policy makers may view movements in commodity prices as useful predictors 
of future inflation. Therefore, the following model is considered: 
     𝛾𝛾�2,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑘𝑘0 + 𝑘𝑘1𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡                                                    (9) 
where 𝛾𝛾�2,𝑡𝑡 is the estimate of 𝛾𝛾2,𝑡𝑡 from (4), DEV = it - 𝚤𝚤̂𝑡𝑡, with 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 being the observed 
(actual) interest rate and 𝚤𝚤?̂?𝑡 the fitted interest rate from estimated rule (3).   
To take explicitly the interdependence between the variables in Equation (9), as 
well as to avoid the presence of heteroskedasticity (Roodman, 2011), the equation is 
estimated through the maximum likelihhod methodological approach. This particular 
methodology generates heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. To match monthly 
monetary policy deviations to the daily frequency of futures contracts we make use of 
the day of the month the contract is traded in relevance to the month that monetary 
policy deviations are considered. Moreover, since the asymptotic distribution of the 𝛾𝛾�2,𝑡𝑡 
estimator is not known, we cannot readily provide the standard errors for the estimated 
parameters. Therefore, we need to resort to bootstrap approximation for the distribution 
and subsequently obtain the bootstrap standard errors for the estimated parameters (a 
procedure as outlined in De Angelis et al., 1993).  
The results are reported in Table 3. The findings in Panel A document that 
deviations from planned monetary policy provide ‘informational’ caskades/spillovers 
to market participants in commodity markets, leading them to behave as members of 





indicate that over the next month a 10-basis point surprise/deviation in interest rates 
increases gold futures prices by about 0.73%, while for the 2-month contracts this 
increase turns out to be 0.78%. However, for the case of the 3-month contracts the 
increase falls to 0.55%. Overall, the responses are higher for the case of precious 
commodities, vis-à-vis the case of agricultural commodities. 
As emphasized by the longstanding hedging pressure theory of commodity 
futures prices, the stronger effects across the futures price frequencies occur with 
respect to the first two months, indicating an ‘overshooting’ effect (Hirshleifer, 1988), 
with the impact dissipating over longer time horizons. This observation received 
statistical support from the Z statistics, recommended by Clogg et al. (1995), which 
tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients k1 and k3 were equal across maturities 
for the same commodity. 
Due to the important roles played by commodity prices in a range of policy 
issues, running from price inflation to energy security and to economic and political 
stability, policy makers across the globe have become increasingly concerned with 
greatly increased commodity price changes. Within such an environment, it is even 
more pressing to fully understand information contained in commodity futures prices 
and how this informational content affects deviations of monetary policy decisions 
from a forward-looking monetary rule. The findings in Panel B display a negative 
association between herding behavior and the reaction coming from the central bank. 
Such results support an active response of the monetary authorities to a ‘herding’ or 
‘bubble’ trend coming from the commodity markets, which makes these results aligned 
to the rationale recommended by Bernanke and Gertler (1999). Once again, the 
estimates of the Zs statistic point out that the estimations are not equal across maturies 
for the same commodity. 






Robustness Checks: The Separation Between Rules- and Discretionary-Based 
Eras 
In this part of the empirical analysis, we make use of the Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. 
(2014) methodology who explicitly divided monetary policy into ‘small’ and ‘large’ 
deviations periods. Based on this methodological approach, we consider the periods 
1990:1-1999:4 and 2006:3-2017:4 as rule-based eras and the period 2000:1-2006:2 as 
a discretionary era. Therefore, we investigate the behavior of the model described in 
Equation (9), across the three time windows mentioned above, along with the maximum 
likelihood methodological approach. The new results are reported in Table 4 and 
illustrate that deviations from planned monetary policy over the discretionary period 
provide stronger ‘informational’ spillovers to market participants in commodity 
markets than corresponding deviations over the rule-based eras. For instance, for the 
case of one-month gold futures contracts, the estimates clearly illustrate that a 10-basis 
point deviations of interest rates from their formal path initiate a 0.49% and 0.52% 
increase in the prices of those contract, while, by contrast, the same basis point 
deviations initiate a 0.84 increase in the same contracts. The results remain consistently 
robust across all commodity futures contracts, as well as across time (i.e., for 2- and 3-
month contracts). Such findings imply a stronger herding behavior and indicate that 
rule-based eras seem to be characterized by signaling ‘more accurate’ monetary policies 
that transmit less uncertainty to commodity market participants.  
Although the results display a negative association between herding and the 
reaction coming from the central bank in both monetary policy eras, supporting an 
active response of the monetary authorities to a ‘herding’ or ‘bubble’ trend in the 
commodity markets, the reaction of the monetary authorities is stronger over the 





to constrain the monetary authorities from reacting excessively to herding in 
commodity markets. Finally, the estimates of the Zs statistics denote that the estimates 
are not equal across monetary policy eras for the same commodity. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Conclusion 
This paper investigated the presence of herding across major commodity markets, as 
well as the hypothesis that U.S. monetary policy could be a major driver for such a 
behavior. The empirical findings provided favorable evidence that herding was present 
in major energy, agricultural, metals and precious metals commodity markets, with the 
U.S. monetary policy potentially driving such a behavior. Additionally, the empirical 
analysis provided supportive evidence of stronger herding over a discretionary-based 
monetary policy era, probably reflecting higher uncertainty associated with the 
performance of the economy in such a period.  
The empirical results highlighted that potentially extraordinary monetary policy 
decisions both on tranquil or distressed times, such as the recent financial crisis, are 
substantially likely to inflict commodity prices. The findings that the deviations of 
monetary policy from a standard rule impact commodity forward prices also indicates 
the presence of information asymmetry in investment markets, which makes herding 
behaviors more intense, since intensify the possibility of informational cascades, as 
well as of reputation and compensation based herding. What is needed is more and 
better disclosure rules, timely provision of data and better designed compensation 
contracts that are expected to make markets and institutions more transparent. This is 
expected to bring more and better information about market expectations into the public 






The findings also point out that commodity prices could be used as an indicator 
for monetary policy; in that respect, policymakers could take commodity prices as 
signals for future inflation and real economic activity. This discussion implies that 
commodity price rises, as those occurred back in 2008, need not be necessarily taken 
as temporary, while potential swings in commodity markets do not necessarily reflect 
a speculative behavior of market participants. Finally, an interesting venue for future 
research could be the extension of this current work to investigate monetary policy 
schemes implemented in other primary monetary policy centers, i.e. the U.K., China, 
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Table 1 Herding estimates between futures commodity prices and deviations of monetary 
policy from a Taylor’s rule: January 1990 to December 2017 (1-, 2-, 3-month futures prices)  
Commodity 𝜸𝜸𝟎𝟎,𝒕𝒕 𝜸𝜸𝟏𝟏,𝒕𝒕 𝜸𝜸𝟐𝟐,𝒕𝒕     R2 Cai test 











































































































































































































































































































      
Notes: 1-, 2- and 3-month results indicate the next three months such contracts are allowed to negotiate. 
Estimated equation is:. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾1,𝑡𝑡�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡�+𝛾𝛾2,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡2 + ut. The model has been estimated using 
the local linear approach proposed by Cai (2007), which allows for heteroskedasticity and serially 
correlated errors. Figures in brackets denote p-values. The Cai test examines the validity of the null 
hypothesis of the constant parameter of 𝛾𝛾2,𝑡𝑡. 











Table 2 Forward-looking monetary policy rule estimates (output is measured as GDP): 
January 1990 to December 2017 







    0.296*** 
    [0.00] 
       0.67     [0.98] 
Notes: The estimations were derived through the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) methodology.  
The instrument list contained lagged values of inflation, the output gap, and interest rates. The J-statistic 
indicates that the employed instruments are valid. Figures in brackets denote p-values. *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 


























Table 3 Estimates of the effect of monetary policy deviations on futures commodity prices: 
January 1990 to December 2017 
_____________________________________________________________________  
Panel A 
Equation: γ�2,t = k0 + k1DEVt + et 
Commodity 𝒌𝒌𝟎𝟎 𝒌𝒌𝟏𝟏 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨.𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐      Zs-statistic 
1-month     
Gold -3.314 [0.03] 7.019 [0.02] 0.07 [0.00] 
Silver -2.346 [0.01] 5.875 [0.00] 0.10 [0.00] 
Platinum -2.006 [0.03] 5.472 [0.01] 0.12 [0.01] 
Oil  -1.764 [0.02] 5.146 [0.01] 0.08 [0.00] 
Natural gas -1.498 [0.04] 5.072 [0.01] 0.11 [0.00] 
Copper -1.543 [0.03] 5.084 [0.01] 0.12 [0.03] 
Aluminim -1.374 [0.03] 5.092 [0.00] 0.13 [0.01] 
Nickel -1.089 [0.05] 3.963 [0.01] 0.09 [0.01] 
Sugar -1.148[0.04] 4.281 [0.00] 0.13 [0.00] 
Corn -1.179[0.03] 4.274 [0.01] 0.12 [0.01] 
Wheat -1.167[0.03] 4.651 [0.00] 0.13 [0.00] 
Oats -1.238[0.03] 4.352 [0.00] 0.14 [0.03] 
Cocoa -1.156[0.03] 4.658 [0.01] 0.12 [0.01] 
Cotton -1.164[0.04] 4.349 [0.00] 0.15 [0.00] 
Coffee -1.251[0.03] 4.568[0.01] 0.14 [0.01] 
2-month 
Gold -3.034 [0.01] 7.429 [0.00]            0.09                   [0.01] 





Platinum -1.675 [0.04] 5.664 [0.01] 0.14              [0.00] 
Oil  -1.613 [0.05] 5.618 [0.01] 0.11              [0.00] 
Natural gas -1.364 [0.04] 5.149 [0.01] 0.15              [0.00] 
Copper -1.175 [0.05] 5.493 [0.01] 0.16              [0.01] 
Aluminim -1.045 [0.05] 5.491 [0.01] 0.15              [0.00] 
Nickel -1.148 [0.04] 4.682 [0.01] 0.10              [0.01] 
Sugar -1.062[0.05] 4.952 [0.00] 0.16              [0.01] 
Corn -1.207[0.04] 4.576 [0.01] 0.14              [0.01] 
Wheat -1.173[0.05] 4.718 [0.01] 0.15              [0.00] 
Oats -1.263[0.04] 4.563 [0.01] 0.13              [0.01] 
Cocoa -1.016[0.05] 5.067 [0.00] 0.14              [0.01] 
Cotton -1.066[0.05] 4.485 [0.01] 0.16              [0.00] 
Coffee -1.032[0.05] 4.671[0.01] 0.15              [0.00] 
3-month 
Gold -2.378 [0.03] 5.409 [0.01] 0.06            [0.01] 
Silver -1.896 [0.04] 5.644 [0.00] 0.09            [0.00] 
Platinum -1.315 [0.05] 5.062 [0.01] 0.11            [0.01] 
Oil  -1.279 [0.05] 5.146 [0.00] 0.09            [0.00] 
Natural gas -1.086 [0.07] 5.095 [0.01] 0.12            [0.01] 
Copper -1.059 [0.06] 5.168 [0.00] 0.13            [0.00] 
Aluminim -1.063 [0.06] 5.117 [0.01] 0.12            [0.01] 
Nickel -1.048 [0.05] 4.052 [0.01] 0.09            [0.00] 
Sugar -1.053[0.06] 4.375 [0.01] 0.13            [0.00] 
Corn -1.144[0.04] 4.126 [0.01] 0.11            [0.01] 





Oats -1.013[0.06] 4.286 [0.01] 0.10            [0.01] 
Cocoa -0.953[0.08] 4.582 [0.01] 0.11            [0.01] 
Cotton -1.058[0.05] 4.129 [0.01] 0.13            [0.01] 
Coffee -1.078[0.05] 4.316[0.01] 0.11            [0.00] 
 
Panel B 
Equation: 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = 𝜅𝜅2 + 𝜅𝜅3𝛾𝛾�2,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡  
Commodity 𝜿𝜿𝟐𝟐 𝜿𝜿𝟑𝟑 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨.𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐      Zs-statistic 
1-month     
Gold 0.037 [0.32] 0.083 [0.02] 0.17 [0.01] 
Silver 0.116 [0.24] 1.065 [0.01] 0.12 [0.00] 
Platinum 1.048 [0.08] 1.175 [0.01] 0.07 [0.01] 
Oil  -0.048 [0.17] 0.078 [0.01] 0.07 [0.01] 
Natural gas -1.005 [0.10] 0.647 [0.02] 0.10 [0.01] 
Copper -0.062 [0.26] 2.185 [0.01] 0.12 [0.02] 
Aluminim -1.002 [0.10] 0.713 [0.01] 0.12 [0.01] 
Nickel -0.226 [0.20] 0.734 [0.01] 0.08 [0.01] 
Sugar -0.835[0.09] 1.382[0.01] 0.13 [0.02] 
Corn -0.915[0.07] 1.329[0.01] 0.14 [0.01] 
Wheat -0.835[0.09] 1.396[0.02] 0.12 [0.01] 
Oats -0.895[0.07] 1.452[0.01] 0.14 [0.02] 
Cocoa -0.874[0.07] 1.448[0.01] 0.13 [0.00] 
Cotton -0.753[0.10] 1.446[0.01] 0.14 [0.01] 
Coffee -0.867[0.07] 1.461[0.01] 0.12 [0.00] 





Gold -0.502 [0.21] 0.509 [0.00] 0.13                   [0.00] 
Silver -0.335 [0.28] 0.615 [0.01] 0.15    [0.01] 
Platinum -0.411 [0.24] 0.565 [0.01] 0.17 [0.00] 
Oil  -0.915 [0.17] 1.242 [0.01] 0.16 [0.01] 
Natural gas -0.914 [0.08] 1.348 [0.01] 0.19 [0.00] 
Copper -0.416 [0.25] 1.632 [0.01] 0.22 [0.01] 
Aluminim -0.373 [0.28] 0.621 [0.01] 0.17 [0.02] 
Nickel -0.212 [0.44] 0.608 [0.01] 0.14 [0.01] 
Sugar -0.483[0.23] 0.909 [0.01] 0.21 [0.00] 
Corn -0.304[0.42] 0.725 [0.01] 0.22 [0.01] 
Wheat -0.486[0.22] 0.903 [0.01] 0.19 [0.01] 
Oats -0.227[0.43] 0.792 [0.01] 0.22 [0.01] 
Cocoa -0.327[0.28] 1.049 [0.01] 0.19 [0.00] 
Cotton -0.426[0.23] 1.005 [0.01] 0.24 [0.01] 
Coffee -0.322[0.38] 1.001[0.01] 0.23 [0.02] 
3-month     
Gold -0.314 [0.25] 0.429 [0.01] 0.10 [0.00] 
Silver -0.115 [0.54] 0.584 [0.01] 0.13 [0.01] 
Platinum -0.231 [0.36] 0.514 [0.01] 0.14 [0.01] 
Oil  -0.125 [0.45] 1.013 [0.01] 0.15 [0.00] 
Natural gas -0.329 [0.23] 1.071 [0.01] 0.19 [0.01] 
Copper -0.242 [0.28] 1.084 [0.00] 0.20 [0.00] 
Aluminim -0.302 [0.25] 0.513 [0.01] 0.14 [0.01] 
Nickel -0.225 [0.42] 0.414 [0.01] 0.12 [0.01] 





Corn -0.215[0.33] 0.606 [0.01] 0.19 [0.01] 
Wheat -0.224[0.35] 0.653 [0.01] 0.18 [0.01] 
Oats -0.226[0.34] 0.539 [0.01] 0.19 [0.00] 
Cocoa -0.235[0.35] 0.832 [0.00] 0.16 [0.00] 
Cotton -0.326[0.30] 0.864 [0.01] 0.20 [0.01] 
Coffee -0.257[0.34] 0.731[0.01] 0.22 [0.01] 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Estimations were obtained through the three stage least squares (3SLS) methodological approach. 
The endogenous variables estimates are built on the maximum–likelihood estimator (MLE), while it 
generates heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The Zs statistic tests the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients k1 and k3 are equal across maturities for the same commodity. Figures in brackets denote p-
values based on bootstrap standard errors coming from 1000 bootstrap replications.  





















Table 4 Estimates of the effect of monetary policy deviations (across both rule-based 1990:1-
1999:4 and 2006:3-2014:4, and discretionary-based 2000:1-2006:2, eras).  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Equation: γ�2,t = k0 + k1DEVt + et 
1-month 
Commodity k1(1990:1-1999:4)   k1(2006:3-2014:4) k1(2000:1-
2006:2) 
    Zs-statistic 
Gold 4.775 [0.00] 5.139 [0.00] 8.175 [0.00] [0.01] 
Silver 4.255 [0.00] 5.774 [0.00] 8.052 [0.00] [0.00] 
Platinum 3.065 [0.00] 5.615 [0.00] 8.148 [0.00] [0.01] 
Oil  2.764 [0.00] 5.524 [0.00] 9.043 [0.00] [0.01] 
Natural gas 2.519 [0.01] 5.193 [0.01] 8.205 [0.00] [0.01] 
Copper 2.358 [0.00] 5.264 [0.00] 9.291 [0.00] [0.01] 
Aluminim 2.548 [0.00] 5.586 [0.00] 8.259 [0.00] [0.00] 
Nickel 3.179 [0.00] 4.665 [0.00] 8.248 [0.00] [0.00] 
Sugar 3.163[0.00] 5.139 [0.00] 9.186 [0.00] [0.04] 
Corn 2.639[0.00] 4.714 [0.00] 9.005 [0.01] [0.01] 
Wheat 2.658[0.00] 5.149 [0.00] 8.763 [0.00] [0.00] 
Oats 3.295[0.00] 4.782 [0.00] 8.351 [0.01] [0.02] 
Cocoa 2.548[0.00] 4.681 [0.00] 9.072 [0.00] [0.02] 
Cotton 3.174[0.00] 5.274 [0.00] 8.437 [0.01] [0.01] 
Coffee 3.154[0.00] 4.752 [0.01] 8.784 [0.01] [0.01] 
2-month     
Commodity k1(1990:1-1999:4)   k1(2006:3-2014:4) k1(2000:1-
2006:2) 
     Zs-statistic 





Silver 4.542 [0.00] 6.084 [0.00] 8.271 [0.00] [0.01] 
Platinum 3.177 [0.00] 5.752 [0.00] 8.594 [0.00] [0.01] 
Oil  2.785 [0.00] 5.516 [0.00] 9.187 [0.00] [0.01] 
Natural gas 2.785 [0.01] 5.437 [0.01] 8.554 [0.01] [0.01] 
Copper 2.524 [0.01] 5.437 [0.01] 9.452 [0.00] [0.01] 
Aluminim 2.582 [0.00] 5.675 [0.01] 8.662 [0.01] [0.01] 
Nickel 3.291 [0.01] 4.872 [0.01] 8.493 [0.01] [0.02] 
Sugar 3.216[0.01] 5.065 [0.01] 9.264 [0.01] [0.01] 
Corn 2.537[0.00] 5.036 [0.01] 9.321 [0.00] [0.02] 
Wheat 2.674[0.01] 5.244 [0.00] 9.081 [0.01] [0.00] 
Oats 3.569[0.00] 5.073 [0.00] 8.615 [0.01] [0.02] 
Cocoa 2.854[0.01] 4.688 [0.01] 9.374 [0.01] [0.01] 
Cotton 3.447[0.01] 5.392 [0.00] 8.679 [0.01] [0.01] 
Coffee 3.285[0.01] 5.042 [0.01] 9.256 [0.01] [0.00] 
3-month     
Commodity k1(1990:1-1999:4)   k1(2006:3-2014:4) k1(2000:1-
2006:2) 
    Zs-statistic 
Gold 4.569 [0.01] 4.916 [0.01] 8.052 [0.00] [0.02] 
Silver 4.029 [0.01] 5.621 [0.00] 7.884 [0.01] [0.02] 
Platinum 3.064 [0.01] 5.268 [0.01] 8.144 [0.01] [0.02] 
Oil  2.586 [0.01] 5.421 [0.01] 8.879 [0.01] [0.02] 
Natural gas 2.544 [0.00] 5.132 [0.01] 8.254 [0.01] [0.04] 
Copper 2.194 [0.01] 5.064 [0.00] 9.109 [0.00] [0.04] 
Aluminim 2.375 [0.01] 5.276 [0.01] 8.199 [0.01] [0.05] 
Nickel 2.911 [0.01] 4.465 [0.01] 8.073 [0.01] [0.05] 





Corn 2.293[0.01] 4.634 [0.01] 9.005 [0.01] [0.03] 
Wheat 2.385[0.01] 5.084 [0.01] 8.654 [0.01] [0.04] 
Oats 3.179[0.01] 4.762 [0.01] 8.092 [0.01] [0.05] 
Cocoa 2.274[0.01] 4.459 [0.01] 9.026 [0.01] [0.03] 
Cotton 3.135[0.02] 5.104 [0.01] 8.139 [0.01] [0.02] 
Coffee 3.052[0.01] 4.674 [0.01] 8.762 [0.01] [0.01] 
Equation: 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = 𝜅𝜅2 + 𝜅𝜅3𝛾𝛾�2,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 
1-month 
Commodity k3(1990:1-1999:4) k3(2006:3-2013:4) k3(2000:1-
2006:2) 
    Zs-statistic 
Gold -0.025 [0.01] -0.038 [0.02] -0.102[0.01] [0.01] 
Silver -0.023 [0.01] -0.049 [0.00] -0.101[0.00] [0.01] 
Platinum -0.032 [0.01] -0.043 [0.01] -0.077[0.01] [0.01] 
Oil  -0.036 [0.01] -0.053 [0.00] -0.078[0.00] [0.01] 
Natural gas -0.019 [0.02] -0.051 [0.00] -0.095[0.01] [0.01] 
Copper -0.042 [0.01] -0.080 [0.00] -0.113[0.00] [0.02] 
Aluminim -0.053 [0.02] -0.070 [0.01] -0.109[0.00] [0.03] 
Nickel -0.068 [0.00] -0.069 [0.00] -0.103[0.00] [0.01] 
Sugar -0.032[0.01] -0.071[0.01] -0.096[0.01] [0.03] 
Corn -0.059[0.01] -0.083[0.00] -0.109[0.00] [0.01] 
Wheat -0.042[0.02] -0.051[0.01] -0.081[0.00] [0.00] 
Oats -0.056[0.01] -0.081[0.00] -0.114[0.00] [0.03] 
Cocoa -0.049[0.02] -0.083[0.00] -0.116[0.01] [0.01] 
Cotton -0.042[0.02] -0.074[0.00] -0.107[0.01] [0.02] 





2-month     
Commodity k3(1990:1-1999:4) k3(2006:3-2013:4) k3(2000:1-
2006:2) 
    Zs-statistic 
Gold -0.023 [0.00] -0.032 [0.00] -0.085[0.00] [0.01] 
Silver -0.022 [0.00] -0.046 [0.00] -0.079[0.01] [0.02] 
Platinum -0.027 [0.03] -0.038 [0.01] -0.072[0.00] [0.02] 
Oil  -0.034 [0.01] -0.045 [0.01] -0.070[0.00] [0.01] 
Natural gas -0.015 [0.03] -0.044 [0.02] -0.080[0.00] [0.01] 
Copper -0.036 [0.01] -0.073 [0.00] -0.092[0.01] [0.02] 
Aluminim -0.045 [0.01] -0.061 [0.00] -0.088[0.01] [0.03] 
Nickel -0.061 [0.00] -0.053 [0.01] -0.084[0.02] [0.01] 
Sugar -0.026[0.01] -0.065[0.00] -0.075[0.01] [0.03] 
Corn -0.051[0.00] -0.072[0.00] -0.086[0.02] [0.02] 
Wheat -0.035[0.01] -0.042[0.01] -0.069[0.01] [0.01] 
Oats -0.045[0.01] -0.064[0.00] -0.101[0.00] [0.02] 
Cocoa -0.041[0.01] -0.072[0.00] -0.097[0.01] [0.01] 
Cotton -0.036[0.01] -0.066[0.00] -0.085[0.01] [0.01] 
Coffee -0.042[0.01] -0.075[0.00] -0.092[0.01] [0.01] 
3-month     
Commodity k3(1990:1-1999:4) k3(2006:3-2013:4) k3(2000:1-
2006:2) 
     Zs-statistic 
Gold -0.020 [0.01] -0.031 [0.01] -0.078[0.00] [0.03] 
Silver -0.017 [0.02] -0.043 [0.00] -0.080[0.00] [0.02] 
Platinum -0.027 [0.01] -0.036 [0.01] -0.077[0.00] [0.03] 
Oil  -0.031 [0.01] -0.045 [0.00] -0.072[0.00] [0.02] 





Copper -0.035 [0.01] -0.074 [0.01] -0.090[0.00] [0.02] 
Aluminim -0.043 [0.00] -0.064 [0.00] -0.093[0.01] [0.02] 
Nickel -0.055 [0.00] -0.060 [0.00] -0.090[0.00] [0.02] 
Sugar -0.024[0.01] -0.058[0.01] -0.081[0.01] [0.03] 
Corn -0.052[0.00] -0.077[0.00] -0.083[0.01] [0.03] 
Wheat -0.035[0.01] -0.044[0.01] -0.074[0.01] [0.03] 
Oats -0.051[0.00] -0.064[0.00] -0.103[0.00] [0.05] 
Cocoa -0.046[0.00] -0.072[0.00] -0.105[0.00] [0.02] 
Cotton -0.035[0.01] -0.070[0.00] -0.102[0.00] [0.02] 
Coffee -0.042[0.00] -0.075[0.00] -0.093[0.01] [0.03] 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Estimations were obtained through the three stage least squares (3SLS) methodological approach. 
The endogenous variables estimates are built on the maximum–likelihood estimator (MLE), while it 
generates heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The Zs statistic tests the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients k1 and k3 are equal across maturities for the same commodity. Figures in brackets denote p-
values based on bootstrap standard errors coming from 1000 bootstrap replications. Here, the Zs statistic 
tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients k1 and k3 are equal across monetary policy eras for the same 
commodity.  
Source: Data come from the Thomson Reuters database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
